granting pardons. Thus, the administration of Hong Kong was not merely executive-led; originally, it consisted of little more than the executive branch.
Initially, both Legislative and Executive Councils consisted exclusively of ex offi cio members, who sat on one (or both) councils due to their position in the colonial administration. However, two " unoffi cial members " were appointed as early as 1850, with the fi rst ethnic Chinese member admitted on a permanent basis in 1884. 10 A second Chinese unoffi cial member was added later, while suggestions for elected representatives were repeatedly rejected. For the British government, the appointment system allowed for the selection of trustworthy British subjects, while any electoral process might have resulted in an unpredictable outcome.
11 Nonetheless, after the Second World War in particular, attempts were made to introduce some form of municipal self-government, which, however, resulted merely in limited direct elections to the Urban Council with little powers. 12 Eventually, an alternative path was pursued to ensure the peace and prosperity of Hong Kong. In response to growing social unrest in the 1960s, the colonial government embarked on a major welfare program with a public housing scheme at its core. 13 In most other British colonies, some form of political participation was introduced gradually from the 1960s onward, usually as a fi rst step on the path to independence. As required by the United Nations Charter, Britain did, in some cases, " develop self-government " in its colonies, " assist[ing] them in the progressive development of their free political institutions. "
14 Yet no such development took place in Hong Kong, which remained untouched by the decolonization 120 Lorenz movement that was sweeping so much of the world in the decades after World War Two. Britain did fulfi ll its charter obligations to report to the UN on Hong Kong periodically, 15 but this reporting ceased in 1972, when the People's Republic requested that the territory be removed from the United Nations' 11 T SANG , supra note 7, at 28. 12 The Urban Council was little more than an advisory board on sanitary matters. See T SANG , supra note 10, at 158 -160. 13 decolonization agenda. 16 According to General Assembly Resolution 742 (VIII), the validity of any form of association between a non-self-governing territory and a metropolitan or any other country essentially depended on the freely expressed will of the people in the territory concerned. 17 Yet Britain saw no need to consult Hong Kongers over the status quo; nor would China want them to have a say in a possible future scenario in which the territory was recovered. Thus, neither country envisaged the decolonization of Hong Kong, in accordance with the UN's self-determination model, as being in their interests.
Sino-British negotiations and the Joint Declaration
In the late 1970s, the tranquility of paternalistic colonial rule was disturbed by the prospect of Hong Kong's return to China. While Hong Kong Island and Kowloon had been acquired by Britain " in perpetuity, "
18 the larger part of the colony (the so-called New Territories) had been leased for ninety-nine years in 1898, and the leasehold was set to expire on July 1, 1997. 19 A fi rst attempt by Britain to ascertain Chinese intentions for Hong Kong was made in 1979. It resulted in an unequivocal statement by Deng Xiaoping that China had always been Hong Kong's sovereign and would recover the territory in its entirety. 20 Yet in 1982, when Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing, the United Kingdom still hoped to retain control of the territory after 1997, trading sovereignty for administration. 21 This would have presupposed Chinese recognition of British sovereignty over Hong Kong. In its initial insistence on the validity of the socalled unequal treaties, Britain failed to appreciate how extraordinarily sensitive China was and still is to the issue of sovereignty; Chinese sentiments were -and are -strongly infl uenced by its descent into semicolonialism in the July 2007 Vol. 5: 419 nineteenth century. 22 Deng made it clear that recognizing British sovereignty over Hong Kong -even with respect to the past -was not an option; consequently, China insisted on " recovering " Hong Kong without qualifi cation in 1997. 23 Deng promised that, up to 1997 and beyond, China would have " an extensive exchange of views with Hong Kong people from all walks of life. "
24 " Hong Kongers ruling Hong Kong " was announced as one of China's guiding principles in early 1982. 25 Nonetheless, when Sino-British negotiations began in the autumn of 1982, the Chinese insisted that they be strictly bilateral; attempts by Britain to include representatives of Hong Kong in an independent capacity were categorically rejected. When the British side tried to involve Governor Edward Youde, arguing that Hong Kong was a " stool with three legs, " Deng Xiaoping maintained that there were only two legs on the stool. Any member of the British delegation not carrying a British passport was not permitted to enter the country. 26 When Chinese members of ExCo dared to express their critical views, Deng reprimanded them, stating that they did not represent Hong Kong society and that the Chinese leadership knew what was best for the territory.
27
Yet it would be wrong to attribute the exclusion of the people of Hong Kong solely to China. In 1979, ExCo members were kept in the dark as to Britain's fi rst contacts with the Chinese over Hong Kong's future. 28 And only after agreement on basic principles had been reached with China did the British foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe disclose the results of the talks to the Hong Kong LegCo. 29 No procedure or framework was set up that would have allowed the inhabitants of Hong Kong to make their views known. When in May 1984, unoffi cial members of LegCo and ExCo traveled to London to offer the views of the Hong Kong population (or at least of a part of it) to members of 22 These sentiments are illustrated by the extensive preamble to the Constitution of the People's Republic, which stresses that " China is a country with one of the longest histories in the world, " and which recounts its people's " heroic struggle " against feudalism and colonialism. Once again, they were told that they " did not represent the views of the people of Hong Kong. " 32 Nor were any concessions made with regard to a possible right of abode in Britain for Hong Kong citizens should the territory be returned to China. 33 They could apply for " British National (Overseas) " status, 34 which, however, did not confer the right of abode. Despite the " moral obligation " toward Hong Kong stressed by many politicians, 35 Britain did not wish to take over any legal obligation.
After protracted negotiations, the United Kingdom and China agreed in a Joint Declaration that the latter would " resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997. "
36 The declaration was based on the principle of " one country, two systems, " whereby the mainland would maintain its socialist system and Hong Kong its capitalist system. 37 It is important to remember that this principle was originally devised for the reunifi cation of Taiwan and China.
38
At the time, Taiwan was as much a one-party state as the People's Republic; thus, the " two systems " did not have a political connotation but referred to the coexistence of two different economic systems within one country. 41 With regard to the region's constitutional structure, the declaration provided for a chief executive to be appointed by the CPG, based on " elections or consultations to be held locally. "
42
The executive authorities would be accountable to the legislature, 43 which was to be " constituted by elections. "
44 The laws previously in force in Hong Kong (that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation, and customary law) would be maintained; 45 the power of fi nal judgment, which had previously rested with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 46 would be transferred to a court of fi nal appeal in the HKSAR. 47 China promised to enshrine the provisions of the declaration in the Basic Law to be promulgated by the National People's Congress (NPC) and which would remain unchanged for fi fty years. 48 During the years leading up to 1997, China and the United Kingdom agreed to cooperate in maintaining Hong Kong's social stability and economic prosperity; 49 to this end, they would establish a Joint Liaison Group. 50 The concept of " one country, two systems " was seen, at least by the Chinese side, as a panacea for any diffi culty the return of Hong Kong might entail. Deng Xiaoping even promoted it as " a new approach to stabilizing the world situation. "
51 Yet this enthusiasm glossed over the intricacies of such an innovative approach. While the combination of different legal systems in one state was not new, 52 there was no precedent for two different economic systems operating within a single sovereign state. 53 The Chinese economy may have begun to adopt capitalist characteristics, yet it has remained centrally governed and planned. Further, by focusing on economics, the concept of " one country, two systems " might underestimate the extent to which a free economy presupposes freedom in other areas or might encourage demands for such freedom.
The agreement on Hong Kong's future was peculiar in another sense. The autonomy of a subnational entity is usually the result of a progressive development, entailing an open-ended process. At the beginning of the process, it is not clear whether, or to what extent, autonomy eventually will be granted or achieved. 54 China, on the other hand, promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy from the outset but provided only sketchy details of the implementation of this promise. Many aspects of the territory's autonomy, such as the constitutional setup, would only be implemented after the handover. In addition, autonomy was guaranteed for a limited period of time only and would become discretionary after fi fty years.
The transitional period
These contradictions fi rst became apparent in the work of the Joint Liaison Group. The " co-operative relationship " and " friendly spirit " 55 with which this group was intended to operate did not prevail for long. The Chinese were suspicious that Britain, as an imperial power, was intent on draining Hong Kong of its wealth before handing it back. 56 They were particularly wary of British attempts to allow Hong Kong's citizens a greater say in politics. The Chinese side maintained that Britain should wait for China to draft the Basic Law and 52 The Roman concept of ius gentium provided for the application of Roman law to Roman citizens and of a modifi ed version to foreigners or peregrini within the Roman empire. M AX K ASER , I US G ENTIUM 4 - Still, 1985 had seen, for the fi rst time, twenty-four out of fi fty-seven legislative councillors returned by election rather than gubernatorial appointment. However, no direct electoral system was introduced: twelve members were selected by an electoral college and another twelve by " functional constituencies, " that is, business groups and professional organizations. 58 Since the early days of the colony, similar schemes had been used to enable certain groups and institutions -such as justices of the peace and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce -to nominate an unoffi cial LegCo member. 59 However, suggestions by the Colonial Offi ce in London to expand and institutionalize such constituencies were rejected by subsequent governors, who argued that even indirect elections might jeopardize the stability of the colony by granting too much participation to its (Chinese) inhabitants. 60 The prospect of the territory's return to China, however, made some degree of political reform unavoidable. If the Joint Declaration were to be accepted by Parliament (and the British public), it would have to offer a semblance of democracy for Hong Kongers. 61 Thus, the idea of functional constituencies, previously spurned, made its comeback. By 1985, however, this concept provided an inadequate and anachronistic approach to public participation, recalling the guild system in the towns of late medieval Europe. Presumably, it served the same purpose -to keep political control fi rmly within the business and merchant classes.
The functional constituencies are a unique feature of the Hong Kong constitutional system, similar, at least in principle, to the university constituencies in the British House of Commons, through which certain universities provided a number of MPs.
62 Today, the Lords Spiritual and, when not concerned with legal matters, the Law Lords in the House of Lords, might be considered 57 T SANG , supra note 7, at 233 -236. 58 M INERS , supra note 8, at 26. The origins of functional constituencies date back to 1884. See T SANG , supra note 10, at 3). 59 G OODSTADT , supra note 14, at 43. 60 Alexander Grantham, governor from 1947 -1957, objected on the grounds that the constituencies necessitated by such a scheme would enfranchise " enthusiastic but inexperienced bodies who have little knowledge of wider policy and whose true value to the community has still to be measured. " G OODSTADT , supra note 14, at 50. Doubts about the loyalty of Britain's Chinese subjects also lingered. 61 T SANG , supra note 7, at 231. functional constituencies of a sort. 63 A similar arrangement is found in the upper house of the Irish parliament, the Seanad Éireann. 64 The introduction of functional constituencies in Hong Kong scarcely represented a dramatic rush to participatory government. Out of a population of 5,456,200, only 46,645 electors (including corporations) could vote in the 1985 functional constituencies elections. 65 Nonetheless, even this cautious approach provoked the Chinese side to insist that this change in the composition of LegCo constituted a breach of the Joint Declaration, even though a change along these lines was mandated by the Declaration, which provided for the election of LegCo by 1997 at the latest. Under Chinese pressure, Britain eventually agreed not to introduce any major changes until the Basic Law was promulgated in 1990. 66
The drafting of the Basic Law
The Joint Declaration had provided only general guidelines for the constitutional makeup of the HKSAR and for its relationship with the CPG, leaving it to the Basic Law to set forth more detailed provisions. This Basic Law would implement the Joint Declaration and, at the same time, prescribe the " system to be instituted " in the HKSAR. 67 Its drafting began in June 1985 with the establishment of the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC), appointed by the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) and operating under 69 It " simply wouldn't work " if " Hong Kong's affairs were administered solely by Hong Kong people while the Central Government had nothing to do with the matter. "
70 Also, there could be forces in Hong Kong " that might engage in obstruction or sabotage, " and China would not allow them " to convert Hong Kong into a base of opposition to the mainland under the pretext of ' democracy. ' " In such a situation, China " would have no choice but to intervene. "
71
With regard to the constitutional system, Deng explained that it would not be appropriate to create a replica of Western systems with the separation of three powers or a parliamentary system; nor would it be " appropriate for people to judge whether Hong Kong's system is democratic on the basis of whether it has those features. " 72 Deng also stated that he did not think it would " be good for Hong Kong " to hold general elections. Hong Kong's administrators should be " people from Hong Kong who love the motherland and Hong Kong, " but a general election would not " necessarily bring out people like that. "
73 If ever general elections were held, it would have to be after a transition period and through a gradual process. 74 And it would always be on the premise that " patriots form the main body of … the future government of the Hong Kong special region. " 75 68 Of the BLDC's fi fty-nine members, thirty-six were from mainland China and twenty-three from Hong Kong. The Hong Kong members had been appointed by the New China News Agency (Xinhua) in Hong Kong. The BLDC was complemented by a Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) of 180 appointed Hong Kongers. For a detailed account, see G HAI , supra note 13, at 56, and Chan, supra note 1, at 5 -8. 69 Deng Xiaoping, Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Committee for the Drafting of the Basic Law of the HKSAR (April 16, 1987), reprinted in D ENG , supra note 23, at 77. 70 Id. , at 76. This somewhat contradicts Deng's earlier statement that China " should have faith in the Chinese of Hong Kong, who are quite capable of administering their own affairs. " Deng, supra note 37, at 16. 71 Deng, supra note 69, at 77. 72 Id. , at 75. 73 Id. , at 75 -76. 74 Id. , at 76. 75 Deng, supra note 37, at 17. According to Deng, " a patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. "
A fi rst draft of the Basic Law was published in April 1988, 76 a second one in February 1989. 77 In accordance with article 31 of the Chinese Constitution, the fi nal version was promulgated by the NPC on April 4, 1990. It entered into force with the establishment of the HKSAR on July 1, 1997.
Constitutional reforms after 1989
By the time the Basic Law was promulgated in 1990, the political climate in Hong Kong had already changed dramatically with the suppression of the student movement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Hong Kongers had shown their support for the Chinese students by several demonstrations, some of them numbering over one million participants 78 -or about 15 percent of the entire population. Suddenly, the Joint Declaration seemed a frail protection against the tanks of the People's Army. The British government came under strong pressure to accelerate the process of democratization in Hong Kong, 79 and to reconsider its stance on immigration policy. 80 There was a general, if belated, sense of guilt on the British side, both with regard to " the painful history of nationality legislation, " and the " failure to introduce democracy to Hong Kong well before the negotiations. "
81 Nonetheless, the British government of the day insisted that granting the right of abode to 3.25 million holders of British Dependent Territories passports was not an option. 82 Instead, the " overriding aim " of the government was to encourage " people whose service [ In response to the demands for extending public participation, 87 eighteen directly elected LegCo seats were introduced in 1991, with a further twentyone selected by the functional constituencies. With this relatively low number, Britain could secure Chinese acquiescence and the prospect of the 1995 LegCo's tenure spanning the handover (the so-called " through train " ). 88 Furthermore, in early 1990 China agreed to the direct election of twenty LegCo members in 1997, twenty-four in 1999, and thirty in 2003. 89 Governor Patten, whose appointment in 1992 was also meant to underline Britain's commitment, 90 raised the number of directly elected members to twenty for the 1995 LegCo elections, with thirty members elected by functional constituencies and ten by an Election Committee. Patten considered the functional constituencies an " abomination, " similar to the " worst abuses of British eighteenth-century parliamentary history. " . Not all provisions were incorporated, with the right to self-determination (provided for by ICCPR art. 1) the most notable absence. 86 The United Kingdom reserved the right not to apply ICCPR art. 25(b) insofar as it may require the establishment of an elected legislature in Hong Kong. See 1007 U.N.T.S. 394. The Bill of Rights stated explicitly that the right to vote and to be elected in periodic universal elections did " not require the establishment of an elected Executive or Legislative Council " (Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) III, 13). The ordinance was not adopted in its entirety into the law of the HKSAR under Basic Law art. 160; most importantly, the provisions requiring interpretation in accordance with the ICCPR were not adopted by the NPCSC. 87 T HATCHER , supra note 21, at 495. 89 G OVERNMENT AND P OLITICS , supra note 7, at 97; T SANG , supra note 7, at 250. 90 Contrary to most previous governors, who were senior civil servants, Patten was a politician. As chairman of the Conservative Party, he ran a successful Tory campaign for John Major in 1992 and was, therefore, close to the prime minister. See C HRIS P ATTEN , E AST AND W EST 13 -15 (Macmillan 1998). 91 Id. , at 58. On the uneven distribution of House of Commons constituencies before 1832, see B RADLEY & E WING , supra note 33, at 151.
In 1991, the functional constituencies comprised 69,825 eligible voters or slightly more than 1 percent of the population. 92 However, as indirect elections were part of the electoral agreements with China, the functional constituencies could not be abolished; instead, Patten increased their number to thirty and enlarged the electorate so that each individual who worked in a profession or business sector was entitled to vote in his or her respective constituency. He also abolished corporate voting. 93 With 1,150,000 individuals entitled to vote for a functional constituency, 94 the governor signifi cantly reduced the inequalities linked to the indirect electoral system. To an outraged China, however, these arrangements violated the " spirit " of both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law;
95 it was decided that after the handover, the 1995 LegCo would be replaced by an appointed Provisional LegCo -the through train had broken down.
96
With hindsight, this outcome should not have been surprising. China had made it clear from the very outset that it would not condone any fundamental changes to the status quo before the handover. Nor would it accept that its future Hong Kong subjects would have a say in their own future. Even though China had denounced British imperialist rule and stressed the ability of Hong Kongers to look after themselves, it was not willing to acquiesce in any last-minute attempts by Britain to introduce democratic elements into Hong Kong's government. Despite Governor Patten's commitment, such attempts did lack conviction, seeing that they began a century and a half after colonial rule, and only once the return of the territory to China had become inevitable. And even at this stage, the British government still seemed more concerned about a possible infl ux of refugees than with the future fate of its erstwhile Hong Kong subjects.
The transitional period shows clearly that Chinese opposition to the introduction of democratic elements in Hong Kong is not a new attitude but has 92 This number still includes corporate votes. F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES , supra note 13, Appendix 5. In 1991, Hong Kong's population had risen to 5,752,000. HKSAR G OVERNMENT , supra note 65, at 8. 93 Furthermore, Patten stopped appointments to the district boards (later district councils), which were, as a consequence, selected through elections only. For an account of Patten's reforms, see T SANG , supra note 7, at 256. 94 F UNCTIONAL C ONSTITUENCIES , supra note 13, Appendix 5; in 1995, the entire population of Hong Kong amounted to 6,156,100. HKSAR G OVERNMENT , supra note 65, at 8. 95 The Basic Law, however, was in no way binding on the British side; in addition, the CPG failed to elucidate which provisions of the declaration had been breached. P ATTEN , supra note 90, at 65 -69. 
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Vol. 5: 419 been a consistent policy for almost three decades. It also illustrates that the new sovereign has the same qualms about elections the United Kingdom itself had over so many years -the essential dilemma being, simply, that outcomes are decided by the voters rather than the rulers.
Constitutional reform in the HKSAR: Dramatis personae

Actors in the HKSAR
The Hong Kong executive
According to the Basic Law, the HKSAR is headed by a chief executive with extensive powers. 97 Some of these are powers commonly vested in the executive branch, such as heading the administration, 98 implementing laws, 99 issuing executive orders, 100 nominating principal offi cials, 101 and conducting external affairs. 102 Yet the chief executive also has to approve the introduction of bills regarding expenditure and revenues. 103 He signs bills and budgets passed by LegCo, and he promulgates laws. 104 In addition, he appoints and removes judges at all levels. 105 Thus, the term " executive-led " is an apt description of the constitutional system. In fact, the Basic Law's provisions concerning the chief executive are reminiscent of the powers allocated to the governor by the Letters Patent. 106 The balance between legislature and executive is heavily tilted in favor of the latter. In the event of confl ict, the chief executive can dissolve LegCo -with the restriction that he may do so only once in each term of his offi ce.
107 LegCo, on the other hand, can only instigate impeachment procedures but has no control over their outcome.
108
The chief executive is formally appointed by the CPG -as was the governor by the British government -for a term of fi ve years, after being selected by election or through consultations held locally. 109 Article 45(2) of the Basic Law states that the method for selecting the chief executive shall be specifi ed " in the light of the actual situation " in the territory and " in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. " The eventual aim is the " selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures. "
110
Annex I specifi es that " if there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executives for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, " such amendments would have to be endorsed by two-thirds of LegCo and by the chief executive, and be reported to the NPCSC for approval.
111
Tung Chee-hwa, a shipping magnate, had been appointed the fi rst chief executive in 1997 by the CPG.
112 Despite a generally uninspiring performance, he was granted a second term in 2002. In 2003, however, his botched handling of security legislation led to large-scale protests 113 and convinced Beijing to look for alternatives. In March 2005, the CPG appointed Tung to an advisory post reserved for retired functionaries, 114 and he duly resigned his offi ce within days -citing health reasons, the only justifi cation offered by the Basic Law for such a unilateral step. 115 The sole candidate for his succession was Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, previously chief secretary for administration of the HKSAR, who was appointed chief executive by the CPG on June 21, 2005. 110 The initial composition of this nominating body -the Election Committee -is set out in Basic Law Annex I art. 2. 111 Basic Law Annex I art. 7. 112 Previously, he had served as an unoffi cial member of Chris Patten's Executive Council. Under his father, the family business had been bailed out by the P.R.C. See The New Merchant Prince , T HE E CONOMIST , July 5, 1997, at 68. 113 Under Basic Law art. 23, the HKSAR government is required to enact laws " to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies. " After large demonstrations with more than half a million participants, the government delayed implementation of its proposals. 
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LegCo
Compared to the executive, the LegCo's powers are restricted: its sixty members may introduce bills relating to government policies only with the written consent of the chief executive. 117 Apart from approving budgets, taxation, and public expenditures, 118 its role is limited to debating and raising questions about acts of the government. 119 Furthermore, any amendment to the Basic Law requires approval by two-thirds of its members. 120 And while the chief executive may dissolve LegCo, the latter does not have the power to act on impeachment. It may initiate investigations into perceived misdeeds of the chief executive and, consequently, pass a motion of impeachment. Yet the fi nal decision is left to the CPG.
121
Annex II to the Basic Law provides rules for the election of the fi rst three legislatures after the handover. 122 In accordance with these rules, the provisional LegCo of 1997 was replaced in 1998 with thirty members selected by functional constituencies, ten by the Election Committee, and twenty by geographical constituencies through direct elections. 123 In 2000, six members were selected by the committee and the number of directly elected members increased to 24. 124 In 2004, thirty members were elected directly and thirty by functional constituencies. 125 The 2004 elections were preceded by a Chinese campaign starting with the republication by the New China News Agency (Xinhua) of the 117 Basic Law art. 74. 118 Basic Law arts. 73(2) and (3). 119 
Basic Law arts. 73(3) -(9).
120 Basic Law art. 159(2). For a detailed discussion of LegCo, see G HAI , supra note 13, at 259 -262. 121 Basic Law art. 73(9). 122 The Basic Law did not provide for a Provisional LegCo ( cf. supra note 96), the legality of which was consequently challenged in the Court of Final Appeal (HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David [1997] H.K.L.R.D 761). The Court held that the 1998 LegCo was the " First LegCo " referred to by the Basic Law, while the Provisional LegCo had been an " interim measure " necessitated by the derailment of the through train. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 123 Basic Law Annex II art. I. The Election Committee was identical to the one selecting the Chief Executive. The number of eligible voters in the functional constituencies had been reduced to 127,075 after the handover, and corporate voting was reintroduced. Cf. supra notes 91 -94 . Also, the Provisional LegCo had changed the voting system, favoring pro-China forces. See G HAI , supra note 13, at 260, note 16. A member of the Committee who was also enfranchised in a functional constituency thus held three votes: one in the Committee, and one each in a functional and a geographical constituency. late Deng Xiaoping's remarks on the concept of " one country, two systems. "
126
As the People's Daily (the CPG's organ) stressed, this republication was " by no means coincidental " but was intended to " point out certain confusions and misconceptions in the recent debate on constitutional development in the SAR and clarify them at the level of principle. " 127 Reference was mainly made to Deng's statement on patriots governing Hong Kong, and to his rejection of universal suffrage. 128 The accusation of Hong Kong democrats being " unpatriotic " was soon added to the barrage. 129 Other traditional means to ferment patriotic feelings, such as military parades, visits by athletes, greetings from astronauts, and incriminations against democratic candidates were also used. 130 For the next election, due in 2008, the Basic Law provides only that the method for forming LegCo " shall be specifi ed in the light of the actual situation in the HKSAR and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress, " with the ultimate aim of having all members elected by universal suffrage. 131 Procedural provisions in annex II -largely mirroring those governing the selection of the chief executive -add that " if there is a need " to change the method for forming LegCo after 2007, any amendment would have to be supported by two-thirds of LegCo and the chief executive. While changes in the method for selecting the chief executive need NPCSC approval, amendments on the LegCo election method have to be reported to the NPCSC merely for the record. 132 central as these institutions may be to governing Hong Kong, they are not autonomous in the true sense of the word. They may instigate policies, implement, or change them; at some point, however, external approbation from China is required. Thus, chapter II of the Basic Law sets out the " relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR. "
According to the Chinese Constitution, the Central Authorities of the People's Republic of China consist, inter alia, of the National People's Congress (NPC), its Standing Committee (NPCSC), the president of the People's Republic, the State Council or Central People's Government (CPG), the Central Military Commission, and the People's Courts. 133 Of these, the NPC, the NPCSC, and the CPG are of particular importance with regard to Hong Kong.
The NPC is the " highest organ of state power " with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority. 134 It comprises close to 3,000 deputies and convenes only once a year. 135 The NPC is vested with the power of amending the Basic Law of the HKSAR.
136
The CPG, or State Council, is the executive body of the NPC and the supreme organ of state administration. It consists of the premier, vice premiers, state councillors, ministers, the auditor general and the secretary-general. 137 The CPG appoints the chief executive of the HKSAR and the principal offi cials of the executive authorities 138 and is responsible for matters touching upon China's sovereignty.
9
The NPCSC is the permanent body of the NPC and holds a wide range of legislative, executive, and judicial powers; 140 in particular, article 67(4) of the Constitution vests the NPCSC with the authority to interpret laws. 141 On specifi c issues, it is the NPCSC that has the fi nal say on most Hong Kong affairs. In some instances, the Hong Kong government reports to the NPCSC 133 XIAN FA ch. III (P.R.C. merely for the record, as with regard to LegCo election procedures subsequent to 2007 . 142 Yet in many cases, NPCSC approval is a precondition for the validity of acts of the HKSAR authorities, and it may infl uence key aspects of governance such as the declaration of a state of emergency. 143 In the context of constitutional development, however, it is the NPCSC's power to interpret the Basic Law that has had the most signifi cant repercussions.
As set out above, 144 constitutional development in Hong Kong is linked to a number of conditions. While the Basic Law delineates a fairly comprehensive system of government with a strong executive, a weak legislature, and an independent judiciary, it acknowledges that this system is not fi nal, that its " ultimate aim " is the selection of both the chief executive (upon nomination by a committee) and LegCo by universal suffrage. 145 Yet the Basic Law does not provide a clear path to reach this aim. There is no generally understood " principle of gradual and orderly progress " in constitutional law, nor is the " light of the actual situation in Hong Kong " especially illuminating. 146 The procedural provisions in annex I and II apply only " if there is a need " for change. Yet given that the present system is not based on universal suffrage, and that the Basic Law sets universal suffrage as the ultimate aim, the need for change is already acknowledged, and thus the additional qualifi cations in annex I and II would seem superfl uous. In the end, the Basic Law leaves ample room for interpretation, and, as a result, for considerable infl uence of the NPCSC.
And the power of interpretation rests exclusively with the NPCSC. Moreover, the NPCSC may interpret the Basic Law at its own initiative.
147 Upon authorization by the NPCSC, Hong Kong courts may interpret on their own -in adjudicating cases -those provisions of the Basic Law that are " within the limits of the autonomy of the Region. "
148 However, in all cases that come within the CPG's purview or bear on the relationship between the CPG and the HKSAR, the courts must seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the NPCSC before making a fi nal, nonappealable judgment. 143 Basic Law art. 18 (4) . See also Basic Law arts. 17(2) and 160 (validity of laws passed by LegCo or under British rule) and 18(3) (application of mainland laws to the HSAR). 144 See supra notes 111, 131, and accompanying text. 145 Basic Law arts. 45(2) and 68(2). 146 
Id.
147 Basic Law art. 158(1).
148 Basic Law art. 158(2).
149 Basic Law art. 158(3) provides: " Only the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) may seek interpretation from the NPCSC. If another court passes a judgment that cannot be appealed, it has to seek NPCSC interpretation through the CFA. "
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The Communist Party of China
Before analyzing how the NPCSC has made use of its powers, it is important to recall some peculiar aspects of Chinese constitutional law: fi rst, there is no separation of powers in the People's Republic. 150 While at fi rst sight, the procedure for NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law is reminiscent of the preliminary rulings handed down by the European Court of Justice, 151 the NPCSC is a political, not a judicial body. Consequently, it has applied a political rather than a legal standard to the Basic Law. Second, the Constitution is but a very vague indication of how decisions are actually taken in the People's Republic, and by whom. Socialist constitutions in general are of a " secondary and functional nature. "
152
Contrary to Western constitutions, they do not aim to restrict state power and protect civil liberties but, mostly, exist only to indicate general policies and are but one means among others to further the revolutionary cause. The main agent of that cause remains the Communist Party of China (CPC). A separate legislative body may well be useful " as long as it keeps the right policies and direction " ; however, " if the policies are wrong, any kind of legislative body is useless. "
153
The CPC appears only in the preamble to the Chinese Constitution, where the party's leadership on the socialist road is stressed. 154 The constitution of the CPC, on the other hand, states that " the Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters. " It is the party that has to " see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the state " fulfill their responsibilities. 155 This supervision is political in nature and, therefore, is guided by political considerations. 156 The position of the 150 See Deng's remarks supra note 72. On the general characteristics of socialist constitutional theories, see G HAI , supra note 13, at 86. 152 G HAI , supra note 13, at 86. 153 Deng, supra note 69, at 75. 154 The leadership of the CPC is one of the four basic principles that form the " guiding ideology of the Constitution. party is further strengthened by the principle of democratic centralism, or " democracy under centralized guidance. " 157 This principle allows for subordinate institutions to participate in the formulation of a policy; however, once a decision has been taken at the top level, it is binding. It also requires the subordination of a lower-level organ to a higher-level organ and of a local authority to the central authority.
158 Consequently, when a decision has been taken by the highest party echelons, it may not be questioned by lower organs, whether they are part of the state or the party structure. This also applies to the NPCSC; therefore, its interpretations of law -including the Basic Law of the HKSAR -will have to be in line with decisions and policies previously adopted by the party leadership.
159 Thus, its interpretations are of a political, rather than legal, nature, and it is bound to rely, inter alia, on " Deng Xiaoping Theory " 160 and its hostility to elections in Hong Kong. 
Interpretation of the Basic Law and constitutional reform
With the return of Hong Kong to China, the Chinese system based on the primacy of the political, on one-party rule, and on democratic centralism has had to accommodate an entity governed by the common law with its emphasis on precedent, due process, an independent judiciary, and judicial review. 162 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) at fi rst supported the extremely narrow view of autonomy advanced by the HKSAR government, namely, that the Hong Kong courts could not review any act of the People's Republic, and that the Central Authorities' competence over Hong Kong was not limited by the Basic Law. 163 The CFA later reconsidered its stance in a case on the right of abode. It now held that the HKSAR courts had the right, and even the obligation, to review any legislative acts of the NPC or the NPCSC for consistency with the 157 X IAN F A art. 3; C ONSTITUTION OF THE CPC, General Program, para. 21 and art. 10. 158 For a more detailed account, see G HAI , supra note 13, at 99. 159 The principle of democratic centralism also applies to interpretations by the NPCSC. See Wen, supra note 141, at 193. 160 See supra note 154. 161 See supra notes 69 -75. Basic Law, and to strike them down if necessary. 164 The CFA also claimed that it was for it alone to decide whether, in adjudicating a case, an interpretation had to be sought from the NPCSC under art. 158(3) of the Basic Law. 165 This muscular approach soon led to strong criticism by the Central Authorities, with mainland legal scholars as its vanguard. 166 They claimed that by exercising constitutional jurisdiction, the CFA had tried to assume " the nature of a sovereign power, " extending " its jurisdiction to Beijing. " Such an approach was " ridiculous, " as China was a unitary country; sovereignty, the scholars maintained, was inalienable and could only be exercised by the CPG. 167 The mainland response showed little understanding of the common law system, in general, and of the principle of judicial independence, in particular. 168 Instead, the mainland scholars insisted that the Chinese constitutional approach, as set out above, should apply to Hong Kong as well. The main supporter of this approach in Hong Kong was, somewhat paradoxically, the chief executive of the HKSAR. He decided to seek an interpretation of the Basic Law provision on the right of abode, even though the Basic Law only provides for referral to the NPCSC by way of the CFA. 169 Nevertheless, the chief executive " suggested " an interpretation by the NPCSC. 170 In doing so, he relied on article 158(1) of the Basic Law and article 67(4) of the Chinese Constitution, thus suggesting that the Basic Law has to be interpreted within the framework of the Constitution, or that the Constitution may, in fact, apply directly to the HKSAR. 171 With his claim that interpretation could be sought " before, during or after a case, " the chief executive undermined the CFA's right to fi nal 164 Ghai, supra note 163, at 17. In Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D 315, the CFA considered interpretation of Basic Law arts. 22(4) and 24(2)(3). The latter states that persons of Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong but to permanent HKSAR residents shall also be entitled to permanent residency. The Hong Kong government relied on an Ordinance passed by the Provisional LegCo to require an exit permit by mainland authorities before permanent residency could be granted. The ordinance was found unconstitutional by the court and severed. 165 Ng Ka Ling at para. 99. The chief executive had invoked the NPCSC in pursuance of a specifi c policy issue, not realizing that he set a precedent for interference in other matters, one which would allow the NPCSC to intervene on its own accord. Indeed, the Standing Committee soon concerned itself with an issue related to the chief executive himself. Tung Chee-hwa had been selected as the fi rst chief executive in 1997. 173 Because he left offi ce after serving only three years of his second fi ve-year term, 174 it was not clear whether his successor would fi nish Tung's term or be elected for a full fi ve-year term. 175 Subsequently, the NPCSC, again at the Hong Kong government's request, ruled that a new chief executive would serve only the remainder of Tung's second term. 176 Therefore, new chief executive David Tsang faced reelection in 2007 and thus had to tread very carefully to secure support and reappointment by the CPG.
Another side effect of the 2003 protests, which eventually led to Tung's resignation, had been the establishment, in early 2004, of a task force on constitutional development. 177 It published its fi rst report in March 2004, examining mainly procedural issues. 178 The report confi rmed that, in the view of the Central Authorities, constitutional development was an issue that affected the relationship between the HKSAR and the CPG, and that the latter would, therefore, have a say in it. 179 Yet the report also concluded that article 159 of the Basic Law need not be invoked when changing the selection procedures stipulated in annexes I and II of the Basic Law.
180 Therefore, no NPC approval would be required. 181 The task force also set out the competence to initiate amendments to annexes I and II once there was a need for such amendments; 182 however, it did not pronounce on who was to decide whether or when such a need existed.
It was this lacuna that the NPCSC, of its own accord, decided to fi ll with yet another interpretation based on Basic Law article 158(1) and, again, on article 67(4) of the Chinese Constitution.
183 First, the NPCSC ruled that, despite the ultimate aim of universal suffrage, there might, in fact, not be any need for amendments in or after 2007. 184 The chief executive was asked to submit a report on the matter, yet the sole authority to decide whether there was a need for amendment or not would lay with the NPCSC, which would take its decision in the light of the actual situation in Hong Kong and with a view to gradual and orderly progress. If, then, such a decision were taken, only the HKSAR executive would be allowed to introduce the relevant motions into LegCo. 185 Thus, the NPCSC has the power to stifl e any proposals by simply denying the need for change; if, however, such a need is acknowledged, the HKSAR executiverather than a more independently minded LegCo -would formulate the relevant proposals. For LegCo, the only way of infl uencing such proposals would be to block amendments by denying them the required two-thirds majority.
The chief executive duly submitted the requested report on April 15, 2004.
186
In principle, Tung Chee-hwa acknowledged the need for amendment, yet at the same time qualifi ed any amendment to be made. Instead of the two principles stated in the Basic Law -gradual and orderly progress and the actual situation in Hong Kong -the report lists nine factors with which any amendment must 179 I SSUES OF L EGISLATIVE P ROCESS , supra note 178, at para. comply. 187 These " factors, " to some extent, state conditions that are to be found neither in the Basic Law nor in its interpretation by the NPCSC. According to the report, the HKSAR, when examining any constitutional change, would, fi rst and foremost, have to " pay heed to the views of the Central Authorities. "
188
Yet while the NPC would certainly have the last -and, after the interpretation of April 6, 2004 (see note 183), also the fi rst -word on amendments, there was no need to grant it a veto during the discussion of amendments as well. 189 The report also claimed that " any proposed amendment must aim at consolidating the executive-led system headed by the Chief Executive "
190
-again, there is no basis for such a requirement in the Basic Law. Nor does the Basic Law stipulate that constitutional development is conditional upon " public awareness on political participation, the maturity of political talent and political groups. " 191 Thus, while basically acknowledging a need for change, the report added so many conditions that any change would be marginal at best. These conditions advocate the preservation of functional constituencies, favor the executive branch, and display a general suspicion of direct elections. 192 The interpretation of April 6 and the chief executive's report had already narrowed the scope for constitutional changes considerably. Yet based on the report, the NPCSC promulgated a decision on April 26, 2004, that effectively barred any substantial changes, ruling that " in the circumstances, conditions do not exist for the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures, " nor for the election of all LegCo members by universal suffrage. 208 Indeed, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Offi ce under China's State Council stated that the vote had not been " in line with the mainstream " of public opinion in Hong Kong and that the CPG was " unwilling to see " the result. 209 An NPCSC member stated that the democratic parties " should be held responsible for halting Hong Kong's democratic development. "
210
The vote on December 21 represented the only juncture at which LegCo could have its say on the government proposals; thus, in order not to be sidelined for the foreseeable future, the prodemocracy forces decided to block the motions. 211 Yet this will also mean that, in accordance with the NPCSC's interpretation of April 6, 2004, 212 the election of the chief executive in 2007 and of LegCo in 2008 will not entail progress toward the aim of universal suffrage. Instead, the tortuous process of selecting an Election Committee for the chief executive was carried out once more. 213 As a feature of this procedure, the 796 members of the committee were entitled to nominate candidates, with each candidate having to secure at least one hundred nominations. 214 In contrast to the 2005 election, two candidates were standing for the chief executive elections on March 25, 2007. 215 For the fi rst time, a televised debate between the candidates was held. 216 But, in the end, the election outcome was predetermined by the CPG, which has to appoint any chief executive -elect 217 senior members of the Central Government had already made clear, a chief executive from the opposition was out of question. 218 The incumbent Donald Tsang was duly reelected by 649 out of 789 votes cast. 219 In his election manifesto, he had promised to " pragmatically seek to achieve a consensus within [Hong Kong] society on the model for universal suffrage " 220 within his fi ve-year term, and to implement reforms that would allow the political system " to move towards democratization. " 221 He did not give any details if, or what, changes to the constitutional arrangement would be considered, or whether he envisaged universal suffrage by 2012 or 2017. 222 power of legislation and interpretation, at least to some extent, in the HKSAR. Under the principle of " one country, two systems, " Hong Kong is not only to enjoy an economic and social system different from the mainland but also a separate constitutional setting. 227 To this end, article 31 of the Chinese Constitution provides for Special Administrative Regions; however, if Hong Kong is to be truly autonomous, this would also require the creation of a " special constitutional zone, " as it were, to be fi lled exclusively by the Basic Law, at least so far as aspects of the " two systems " are concerned. On the other hand, the HKSAR government and the NPCSC have, in the context of interpretation, repeatedly relied on the Chinese Constitution, thus arguing for its application to the HKSAR. 228 Yet applying the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, for unrestricted power of the NPC, would make nonsense of Hong Kong's autonomy. 229 With the ultimate constitutional aim clearly delineated, the criteria of " gradual and orderly progress " and the " actual situation in Hong Kong " become central. 230 The Basic Law comes with an expiry date, thus setting a time limit for the achievement of universal suffrage: the law is valid for fi fty years -until 2047, 231 by which time, at the latest, both LegCo and the chief executive must be elected by universal suffrage. So far, progress has been not merely gradual but negligible. Since an electoral element was fi rst introduced to LegCo in 1985, democratic elements have been added in a very cautious manner, frequently taking two steps back after advancing one step -most notably with the Provisional LegCo in 1997. 232 With regard to the " actual situation in Hong Kong, " the NPCSC's assumption that Hong Kong still lacks the experience necessary to practice democratic elections 233 can be made indefinitely, as long as democratic elections are not held. It is diffi cult to see how the NPCSC, as an appointed body in a communist system, should be ideally suited to pronounce on matters of universal suffrage. In addition, the LegCo elections in 2004 saw a vigorous political culture that would do honor to many mature democracies.
Responsibility for the slow progress lies, fi rst and foremost, with the Central Authorities. In 1985, Deng had stated that Hong Kong had to be governed by 227 In fact, the capitalist economic system would be irreconcilable with the constitutional system as prescribed by the Chinese Constitution. 228 See supra notes 169, 183, and accompanying text. 229 On the relationship between the Basic Law and the Constitution, see Yash Ghai, 
